US History/US History (Bureau Development Inc.)(1991).ISO/dp/0137/01376.txt

Text File | 1990-12-23 | 34KB | 580 lines

$Unique_ID{USH01376}
$Pretitle{121}
$Title{Criminal Justice - New Technologies and the Constitution
Chapter 1  The Technological Revolution in Criminal Justice}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Udall, Morris K.}
$Affiliation{US Congress}
$Subject{rights
amendment
criminal
justice
law
right
crime
process
privacy
evidence}
$Volume{}
$Date{1988}
$Log{}
Book:        Criminal Justice - New Technologies and the Constitution
Author:      Udall, Morris K.
Affiliation: US Congress
Date:        1988

     Overview of Criminal Justice - New Technologies and the Constitution

The Office of Technology Assessment has examined ways in which continuing
scientific and technological advancements have influenced the scope and
meaning of our existing constitutional principles.  This report describes the
new technologies being used in criminal justice and addresses the delicate
balance that must be maintained between the national interest and individual
rights.

Chapter 1  The Technological Revolution in Criminal Justice

     As recently as the 1960's, criminal justice institutions lagged far
behind business and Federal Government agencies in adopting new technology.
Then, in 1967, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice made sweeping recommendations for modernizing the
administration of criminal justice with new technologies.  The technological
innovations that followed in the next two decades have transformed nearly
every component of the criminal justice system.

     This technological transformation is continuing.  Advanced technology,
growing directly out of recent developments in basic science, is finding
immediate application in the investigation of crime - for example, DNA typing.
New technologies are also used in trials and in judicial decisionmaking - for
example, computer models based on social science research are used in
assessing the likelihood of recidivism.  Finally, new technologies such as
electronic bracelets are being used in corrections. Others, such as hormonal
therapy for sex offenders, are being tested in experimental programs.

     Three categories of scientific knowledge appear most promising for
criminal justice, in terms of the technological capabilities that they can
provide.  In criminal justice applications, these three areas of science and
technology converge and complement each other.

     The first is information science, already providing the criminal justice
system with a broad array of computer and telecommunications technologies.
Surveillance technology can enhance the investigation of crime.  Computers
will offer nearly unlimited possibilities for aggregating information and
sharing it with other criminal justice agencies.  They can also be used to
model or simulate the outcomes of alternative prevention and correction
strategies.

     The second important field is molecular biology (sometimes called "New
Biology").  Studies of the chemical and genetic basis of human behavior or
mental functioning promise new techniques for identification, testing, and
screening, using body fluids or tissues.  They may also become the basis of
behavior modification or control.

     The third field is social science research, still relatively
underdeveloped by comparison with physical and biological sciences, but
increasingly being used to build statistical and behavioral models and
decision guidelines.

     Each has a dark side, an aspect of social cost or social risk.
Information technologies, for example, can lead to gross violations of
individual privacy.  The use of molecular biology to substitute "treatment for
behavior disorders" for "punishment for criminal actions" is a profound change
in the paradigms of social control.  It brings into question the assumption of
individual responsibility for behavior, which is one of the underlying
principles of constitutional government.  Social science models are
constructed from data on populations or large groups of people.  If used to
predict individual behavior in making decisions about probation or sentencing,
they could reinforce discriminatory stereotypes and penalize people who are
poor, undereducated, or members of minorities.  Under some circumstances,
social science predictions of recidivism could result in decisions that
approach being punishment in anticipation of crime.

     In evaluating new and emerging technologies for use in criminal justice,
one aspect that is sometimes overlooked is the possibility that they may
affect the constitutional rights of those suspected, accused, or convicted of
crime.  For example, the development of wiretapping technology for the
detection and investigation of crime resulted in several decades of
uncertainty as to whether wiretapping without a judicial warrant was "an
unreasonable search and seizure" in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  It
required repeated actions by both the Supreme Court and the Congress to fully
resolve this uncertainty.

     More recent technological innovations in law enforcement and criminal
justice are likely to result in similar challenges to their constitutionality.
One can anticipate some of these challenges by considering potential
innovations in comparison with earlier innovations, and in the context of
continuing trends in constitutional interpretation. Legislators and criminal
justice administrators may then be able to shape the use of technology in ways
that more clearly avoid infringing on constitutional rights.

Criminal Justice and Constitutional Protections

     Articles I and III of the U.S. Constitution and 4 of the 10 amendments in
the Bill of Rights address the rights of those suspected, accused, or
convicted of crime.  The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments include
prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures (of evidence), double
jeopardy, and forced self-incrimination; the guarantees of the rights to grand
jury indictment, trial by jury, confrontation of witnesses, and calling of
defense witnesses; and the far-reaching requirement of due process in criminal
justice proceedings.

     The writers of the U.S. Constitution were acutely aware that tyrannical
governments had often used accusations of crime to rid themselves of political
dissidents.  They recognized also that in punishing crime, the state most
directly and forcefully intervenes to take the life, liberty, or property of
its citizens.  Respect for the rights of even the most despicable violators of
law and social order has been a fundamental cornerstone of American criminal
justice, in theory if not always in practice.  When, therefore, new scientific
knowledge or new technological capabilities are brought into the service of
law enforcement, it is right and necessary to inquire into their possible
effects on constitutional safeguards.  To begin that inquiry, it will be
helpful to review briefly what those safeguards are.

     Throughout the following discussion, reference will be made to the 14th
Amendment, which is not part of the Bill of Rights.  The 14th Amendment,
ratified in 1868, provided that all persons born in this country (or later
naturalized) are citizens of the United States and of the State in which they
live.  This was intended to protect former slaves and their descendents.  The
Amendment then says that:

     No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

     Until 1868 the prohibitions and protections of the Bill of Rights
restrained only the Federal Government.  Even after the 14th Amendment, the
Supreme Court ruled in 1873 that most of the basic civil rights were not
privileges or immunities of U.S. citizenship, but resulted from State
citizenship.  This meant that the 14th Amendment still did not subject the
State governments to the restraints of the first 10 amendments.  Instead, the
Supreme Court used the 14th Amendment's Due Process Clause to protect the
property rights of "corporate persons" by striking down a series of State laws
aimed at improving working conditions.

     Over the last four decades, however, the Supreme Court has reconsidered
this position and has said that the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment
incorporates most of the rights listed in the first 10 amendments.  It has
said in effect that "due process" summarizes fundamental concepts of justice
and liberty, some of which are specified in the Bill of Rights.  This includes
most, although not all, of the protections in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and
Eighth Amendments, as will be noted in the discussion that follows.

     State constitutions also include Bills of Rights.  Now they are generally
patterned on the U.S. Bill of Rights, but in 1789, the First Congress drew on
provisions in some State constitutions, which incorporated some of the
traditional common law rights of Englishmen, in framing the first 10
amendments.  Today some of the rights guaranteed in State constitutions may go
beyond the effective scope of Federal rights.

The Prohibition on Unreasonable Searches and Seizures

     The meaning and scope of this Fourth Amendment prohibition has repeatedly
been brought into question by changing technology.  It reads:

     The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath and affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.

     British authorities in the American colonies had issued general "writs of
assistance" that allowed searches at will or on slight suspicion, especially
for contraband smuggled in violation of Parliamentary duties on imports.  This
was a factor in the unrest that eventually led to the American Revolution.
The Fourth Amendment required a warrant issued by a magistrate, so that law
enforcement officials could not invade personal property and privacy at their
own discretion, or for purposes of harassment.  This constraint now applies to
State government actions as a result of the 14th Amendment.

     Nearly every phrase in the Fourth Amendment has been frequently
challenged, often because of technological changes.  Those who drafted this
provision in 1789 could not have foreseen automobiles, wiretapping, remote
sensing, or biosensors.  As early as 1925 the Court allowed warrantless
searches of moving vehicles because automobiles had made possible the rapid
movement of suspects and evidence out of a jurisdiction.

     Beginning in 1928 Congress and the Courts have had to consider whether
use of electronic surveillance devices was a search and, more recently,
whether accessing computerized databases was a seizure.  Courts have had to
decide whether evidence may be sought in bank records, medical histories, and
insurance files, on paper or in computerized databases.  Questions have arisen
as to whether and when authorities may "seize" one's breath (for analysis for
alcohol), or one's urine, semen, blood, or other fluids and tissues.

     The development of electronic surveillance technology, biosensors and
biological testing and screening technologies, and computer-matching and other
data aggregation techniques has made many kinds of routine or random
surveillance easier, cheaper, and less visible to those who are monitored.  In
many places, for example, police are increasingly using sobriety checks and
photographing traffic to apprehend speeders; Federal and State agencies use
computer-matching to detect fraud and abuse in welfare programs; and public
employers use random drug testing to enforce workplace rules.  In the past,
concern about surveillance and privacy has generally focused on the
constitutional rights of individuals who are suspected of criminal activity.
But many people are now concerned that the increasing use of monitoring
techniques may impinge on the privacy of the general public, and indicates a
subtle widening of the net of social control that goes far beyond traditional
democratic practices.

     The Rights of the Accused

     There are several specific protections for those accused of crime in the
body of the U.S. Constitution, predating the Bill of Rights.  Article I,
Section 8, guarantees that the writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended
except in time of rebellion or invasion.  The same Section prohibits bills of
attainder and ex post facto laws.

     Habeas Corpus means that a person may not be imprisoned without being
brought before a judge, who ascertains that the imprisonment is legal and for
cause.  The name comes from a common law writ that usually began with those
Latin words, which mean, "You should have the body . . ." i.e., have evidence
that a crime has occurred.  A bill of attainder removed all civil rights and
protections from one who had been convicted of certain crimes, usually
treason.  An ex post facto law would make punishable some action performed
before the law was passed.

     Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution guarantees a trial by
jury for all crimes.  It also provides a strict definition of treason and the
requirements for conviction of treason.

     Three amendments - the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth - further protect the
rights of those accused of crime.  Most of these protections have, in the last
two or three decades, also been held to apply to State actions.  Most State
constitutions had similar protections, but they were not always enforced.

     The Fifth Amendment begins with a provision that:

     No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.

     A resolution of the 1788 Massachusetts convention for ratification of the
Constitution insisted that the right to a grand jury be added to the
Constitution.  The right was already incorporated in the Constitution of the
State of North Carolina.  The concept of a grand jury goes back in English
common law to the time of William the Conqueror, who took the throne of
England in 1066 A.D.  But the Fifth Amendment requirement of grand jury
indictment does not apply to State governments.

     The purpose of a grand jury is to indict or formally accuse one or more
persons of crime, but only if there is sufficient evidence to justify a trial.
A grand jury cannot convict one of having broken a law.  It must refuse to
indict if the evidence is inadequate to establish that a crime has occurred
and there is cause to suspect the accused and to believe that his conviction
may result.  Thus access to a grand jury is a protection against arbitrary
actions and harassment of citizens by government or its officers.

     The Fifth Amendment also provides that no one may:

 . . . be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb . . .

That is, one may not be tried twice in Federal courts for the same offense. If
the government fails to get a conviction on the first attempt, it cannot
continue to persecute or harass one through the threat of repeated trials.
However, one may be subject to both civil and criminal penalties for the same
act, and may also be tried by both Federal and State Governments for some
actions.

     Under the Fifth Amendment, no person:

 . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself. . . .

In English common law, this prohibition forbade torture or trial by ordeal. In
modern times, it has protected one from being forced to give evidence against
oneself in the courtroom.  In this century, the question raised was whether
one was protected only within the courtroom, or during police questioning as
well.  If one can be forced by the police to confess, or to provide evidence
against oneself, protection against self-incrimination in courtroom testimony
may be too late to be effective.

     Until 1966, the Supreme Court used the Due Process Clauses in the Fifth
and 14th Amendments to reverse convictions that rested on evidence gotten by
the police through coercion, which might range from physical punishment
through psychological pressure.  But in Miranda v. Arizona in 1966, the Court
specifically extended the reach of the prohibition on self-incrimination to
police questioning, and said that no conviction would be upheld unless the
suspect had been told his rights.  A conviction can be reversed even if there
is independent evidence sufficient to prove guilt.

     Science and technology have raised questions about the scope of self-
incrimination.  Statements made under psychiatric examination are protected.
However, the protection against self-incrimination has not been extended to
cover non-testimonial evidence provided by modern technology.  The Court has
affirmed that police may cause a physician to draw blood from a suspect to
determine its alcohol content when there is reasonable suspicion of
drunkenness, even over the suspect's objections.  Evidence in the form of
breath content, semen, hair, or tissue samples may also be taken without
consent of the suspect, when taken in a manner that does not "shock the
conscience."

     The Sixth Amendment guaranteed the right to:

. . . a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury . . .

in all criminal prosecutions.  This right was intended to prevent "undue and
oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern
accompanying public accusation, and to limit the possibility that the delay
will impair the ability of the accused to defend himself."  It does not
prevent long delays caused by the defendant and counsel themselves. Recently
attention has turned to the question as to whether long delays do not
threaten the public interest rather than those of the defendant, but this is
not covered by the Sixth Amendment.

     The right to a "public" trial has been challenged because of technology;
does "public" mean that cameras must be allowed?  Could trials be broadcast?
The right to public trial is a right of the defendant and not a right of the
press, and many verdicts have been challenged by those convicted on the
grounds of too much rather than too little public involvement in trials.
Courts have allowed reporters and even television cameras access to public
trials, but they are not required to do so.

     Article III of the U.S. Constitution already required trial by jury of
all Federal crimes, without the Eighth Amendment.  This redundancy emphasizes
its importance under English common law. The right is construed to say that a
trial jury must have no more and no less than 12 people, and a unanimous
verdict is necessary for conviction. The right to a jury trial may be waived
by a defendant, but a judge may still rule that a jury is necessary.

     States are not prevented by the Sixth Amendment from having a jury of
fewer than 12 in criminal procedures, nor must they require unanimous votes
for conviction.

     "Scientific" selection of juries - that is, attempts to influence the
acceptance of 12 jurors to reflect demographic, social, economic, or cultural
patterns desired by one side or the other - is a recent development. It is not
yet clear whether it has constitutional aspects or implications.

     The Sixth Amendment also requires that an accused person

. . . be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, . . . be
confronted with the witnesses against him; . . . have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and . . . have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defense."

     The right to have "assistance of counsel," by virtue of the Miranda
decision, now begins as soon as the person is taken into custody by the
police.  Only in 1978 was this provision extended to the States under the 14th
Amendment's Due Process Clause.

     With new technology, courts have allowed certain accusers to be
confronted by the accused only indirectly; for example, allegedly abused
children have been questioned and videotaped in Judge's quarters, and the
tapes later shown to the jurors.

     People who are accused may not be able to defend themselves adequately in
court if they have been unable to seek evidence and witnesses because they
were held in prison from the time they were accused until they were brought to
trial.  The Eighth Amendment forbids "excessive bail," that is, bail should
not be set prohibitively high, but only high enough to make it probable that
the accused will appear for trial.  A person can however be denied bail when
the possible penalty for the crime is death, since avoiding this would be
worth the loss of any amount of money.

     The Bail Reform Act of 1966 allowed magistrates to take into account
other factors, such as prior criminal offenses and family and community ties
that would discourage running away.  These changes reflect in part the results
of social science research and computer simulations that relate such factors
to the probability of undesirable future behavior.  Recent legislation further
eases the restrictions on pretrial detention where there is reason to think
the accused may commit other crimes while awaiting trial.

The Rights of Those Convicted of Crimes

     Once convicted of a crime, people still have constitutional protections.
The Eighth Amendment says that:

     Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

     "Cruel and unusual punishment" in 1789 meant imposition of severe
physical pain through such punishments as burning at the stake, crucifixion,
breaking on the wheel, and the thumbscrew.  It was not construed at that time
or subsequently to include capital punishment, whether by the old technologies
of hanging or shooting or the later technologies of electrocution, lethal gas,
or injection.  There has, however, been a movement in the direction of lethal
technologies generally considered less painful to the victim.  Arguments have
been made that in the modern world, "early" death is less usual and hence more
"cruel" than it was 200 years ago, but this has not been accepted by the
courts.  The Supreme Court has however recognized that the standard of "cruel
and unusual" can change over time.  It has declared that punishment is cruel
and unusual when out of proportion to the offense, when it punishes illness
(i.e., addiction to drugs, without evidence of a crime), or when it involves
loss of citizenship (i.e., for desertion from the armed forces).

     The protections of the Eighth Amendment apply against actions of the
States under the 14th Amendment.

Due Process

     The broadest, most frequently cited, and most frequently challenged
protection of the Fifth Amendment, repeated in the 14th Amendment, is the
provision that a person may not:

 . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.

     The Court has developed two complementary concepts of "due process,"
i.e., procedural due process and substantive due process.  Procedural due
process means that laws and their applications must not be arbitrary, vague,
or inconsistent in effect; all legal standards and procedures should be
basically "fair," regular, and ordered.  Disputes about procedural due process
under the Fifth Amendment have generally centered on whether this is an
additional limitation on the Federal Government, or merely reinforces the
other provisions of the Bill of Rights.  Justice Black and other Justices have
held the latter view, on the grounds that to strike down a law because it
violates general standards of justice is to give too much discretion to
courts, but there is no clear rule on this point.

     "Substantive due process" looks to the purpose and substance of a law or
government procedure rather than to the way it is used.  This concept holds
that laws and policies must be rationally related to legitimate legislative
objectives; some areas are beyond the reach of government power.  This concept
was developed and applied sporadically, after about 1890, first to strike down
economic regulations that limited property rights, but later to expand the
scope of personal rights, especially those related to contraceptive
technology, abortion, and marital privacy.  From 1890 to 1937, substantive due
process was generally used to assert freedom of contract.  The Court struck
down laws fixing minimum wages and hours of labor, forbidding employers to
fire workers for joining unions, and prohibiting child labor.  After 1937, the
Court refused to use the concept of substantive due process in this way.
Thirty years later, it again began to use the concept to wall off from
government interference certain private activities, primarily marriage,
procreation, child rearing, and educational choice, held to be beyond the
appropriate reach of legislation.

The Right of Privacy

     Those who have been convicted of crime have a diminished right of privacy
as compared with other people; but this right does constrain the activities of
governments in investigating, prosecuting, and punishing crime.  The Bill of
Rights does not use the word "privacy," nor is this right explicitly stated
elsewhere in the U.S. Constitution; but the Bill of Rights as a whole is
understood to define or indicate a "penumbra of privacy" where government
should not intrude.  Thirteen State constitutions contain explicit guarantees
of a right to privacy.  For example, the Constitution of the State of
California includes the right to privacy among the "inalienable rights" listed
in Article I, Section 1.

     At the Federal level, Judge Brandeis said in a 1928 wiretapping case that
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments together recognized "a right to be let alone,"
which is the right "most valued by civilized men."  Brandeis was however in
dissent in that case.  In a 1958 civil liberties case Justice Harlan spoke of
the "vital relationship between freedom to associate (in the First Amendment)
and privacy in one's associations."  In a 1969 pornography case Justice
Marshall said that regulation of obscenity cannot extend into "the privacy of
one's own home," and that the government has no business to tell a man
"sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may
watch."

     The right to privacy was made explicit in Griswold v. Connecticut, in
1965, striking down a contraceptive law.  Since then it has been expanded to
include other aspects of marriage, reproduction, and health.  It is usually
based on the Due Process Clause and on the Ninth Amendment doctrine of
retained rights, and more generally on a "zone of privacy or penumbra created
by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.

     The right to privacy has two slightly different aspects: one of personal
autonomy, a sphere of action (such as reproduction) where the individual makes
choices without interference by government unless there is a compelling public
interest; and one of confidentiality, where government or the public in
general has no right to know something about an individual.  In general, the
right to autonomy is diminished when one is formally accused of crime and very
narrowly constrained if one is convicted of crime; and similarly, the right to
confidentiality is also progressively diminished for those suspected, accused,
or convicted of crime.  These personal rights, however, while narrowed do not
disappear.  Prisoners retain some claim both to personal privacy and to
autonomy - for example, rights to basic religious observances and to consent
or refusal to participate in medical research projects.

Technological Trends

     There are many indications that continuing trends in technology will
stimulate continuing reexamination of the constitutional rights of those
suspected, accused, or convicted of crime.  Information technology, in
particular, is permeating all phases of the administration of justice.  As
used in surveillance, it strongly supports law enforcement but involves risks
of violation of the constitutional right to privacy.  Sensing techniques -
involving sight and photography, sound and tapping or taping, and a variety of
biological sensors - are increasingly powerful, able to operate at great
distances, miniaturized and easy to conceal, and otherwise undetectable to the
subject.  In the form of data aggregation, storage, and processing systems,
information technology allows local jurisdictions to cooperate, decreasing
their dependence on national law enforcement agencies.  But it also creates
records that are persistent and widely shared, and difficult for the subject
to know about, to access, to verify, or to correct.

     Emerging technologies based on molecular biology may reveal some of the
causes of violent, aggressive, and antisocial behavior.  They could also be
used to manipulate or control behavior, and this would risk violations of
individual autonomy.  And they could provide information about people, thus
risking invasions of privacy.

     Social science-based techniques are increasingly used to predict,
manipulate, and control behavior, and to guide and standardize decisions
related to law enforcement and criminal justice.  By depersonalizing the
decisionmaking process they may attribute to individuals the characteristics
of groups and in so doing may have the paradoxical effect of increasing the
risk of violating equal protection of the law.

     All of these technologies, and the scientific knowledge on which they are
based, may affect the nature of evidence that is used in identifying
offenders, and in helping juries determine their guilt or innocence.  A
knowledge of scientific principles and methodology may be necessary to fully
understand the means by which this information was gathered, what it
indicates, and the degree of certainty or uncertainty in this interpretation.
Lay judges and juries may have difficulty in reaching this understanding.
Knowing this, courts have often been slow to accept new kinds of
technology-mediated information.  This is a necessary safeguard; there must be
very high reliability in presenting evidence to a jury. Experts have remained
divided on the reliability of polygraphs, for example, and courts have not
accepted such evidence.  The use of evidence based on advanced science and
technology could also put some defendants (especially those who are indigent
or not highly educated) at a relative disadvantage.  At the same time, both
law enforcement agencies and government prosecutors may be unnecessarily
handicapped in identifying and prosecuting criminals, if courts are
unnecessarily slow to accept scientifically sound evidence.

     There are nontechnical reasons to examine carefully how technologies are
used in criminal justice.  Many new science-based technologies have similar
effects which could degrade constitutional protections:

     They increase the ability of government to observe, control, or intervene
in the affairs of an individual singly, rather than with large groups or the
public as a whole; this could erode the effectiveness of constitutional
restraints based on common law formulations.

     They allow investigation or surveillance at a distance, or out of sight
of both the subject and concerned public interest groups; generally raising
the level of surveillance and narrowing the expectation of privacy in Society.

     By increasing the power of government to detect infractions and prosecute
or punish minor infractions of law, they may either enhance the achievement of
law and order, or widen the net of social control, or do both.

     While bringing greater expertise to bear on crime investigation and
control, they also tend to move decisionmaking about guilt and about
punishment from laymen (peers, citizens) to experts (the technical elite).

     Some suggest alternatives to traditional modes of correction or
punishment, which in turn may create issues of equal treatment or equal
protection of the laws.

     They may increase the disparity between rich and poor, highly educated
and under-educated, in the ability to defend oneself in court or in the
penalties that are visited on those found guilty.

     While these characteristics give cause for caution, modern technology
holds great promise for improving the enforcement of criminal laws and the
administration of criminal justice, to the benefit of all Americans.  With the
aid of electronic surveillance, Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems,
mobile digital computers, and expert systems, for example, police can make
more arrests and apprehend more serious offenders.  Similarly, technological
advancements and new methodologies can, if wisely used, enable prosecutors,
courts, and corrections officials to concentrate their often limited resources
on violent and repeat offenders.  Innovations in decisionmaking, such as
development of criteria and guidelines, improve the consistency of the
criminal justice process.  The benefits of these technologies are
well-established and apparent, in spite of some potential for abuses.